Abstract: The collapse of the experimental Ayr Bank was the central episode of the 1772-3 credit crisis, and is used as a prominent example in Adam Smith's monetary analysis in the Wealth of Nations. Subsequent literature on the affair has been overly influenced by a small number of printed sources, and has propagated their biases. This article uses previously unpublished manuscript evidence to reconstruct and extend the existing narrative of this famous episode, and identifies the issuance of redeemable annuities in response to the bank's stop of payments in June 1772 as the main cause for the size of its losses. 
not necessarily the major part) of the bank's partners. Apart from propagating any inherent biases, this has also limited modern literature to following primary sources only to 1778. As the bank never went bankrupt but paid all its creditors in full over several decades, the story of one of the first unwindings of a major financial institution has thus remained untold. Furthermore, there has been occasional confusion surrounding the events which led to the bank's stop of payments in June 1772, as well as a propagation of second-hand and even apocryphal figures concerning the financial details.
This article will re-establish the narrative of this important affair based on contemporary manuscript evidence surviving in Scottish archives, and will extend it four decades beyond its traditional 1772-8 timeframe. It will argue that although the bank's business model was flawed and its position in June 1772 precarious, its fate was sealed only after the ill-advised attempt to stay afloat by raising £450,000 in life annuities at an interest rate between 12 and 14 per cent. Although the bank's books have not survived, it is possible to quantify this narrative through the financial records and voluminous correspondence of George Home of Branxton (1734-1820), the lawyer who served as factor and manager for the bank between 1773-93.
The article is structured as follows: Part I discusses the motivation and business model of the bank, and reviews the traditional account of its failings. Part II examines the ways in which the panic that broke out in London in June 1772 led to the bank's stop of payments. Part III focuses on the pivotal decision to issue the annuities, and the series of reflexive actions the bank was forced into as a result.
Part IV describes the unwinding of the bank's assets over the period 1774-1816. Part V concludes with the final loss figures from the venture, and puts them into context.
I
The co-partnership of Douglas, Heron, and Co., commonly known as the Ayr Bank, was established on 6 November 1769 for a nominal term of 21 years, with £96,000 of subscribed (but not paid-up) capital. Unlike the two Edinburgh public banks, the Ayr Bank was unincorporated, but was nonetheless a joint-stock company enjoying the advantages of share transferability and a separate legal personality from its 136 founding partners. 10 The latter were an impressive selection of the contemporary lists. Table 1 presents the demographics of the co-partnership over its short life as a going concern. Although categorisation by profession should not be taken as mutually exclusive, as merchants and lawyers could also own estates, it is still accurate to state that 'the basis of Douglas Heron's credit was land'.
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Although the Ayr Bank was not the first Scottish country bank, it was certainly the largest and best supported that had hitherto appeared. Its mission statement was unabashedly ambitious, starting with its Pro Bono Publico motto.
Convinced that 'the business of banking, when carried on proper principles, is of great public utility, particularly to the commerce, manufactures, and agriculture of a country', 13 the founders made no secret of what they regarded as the unreasonable meanness of the Edinburgh banks. Following the final defeat of Jacobitism and victory in the Seven Years War, the Scottish economy had entered an expansionary phase in such sectors as linen manufacture and canal building, while Glasgow had become the main entrepot for American tobacco. 14 Growth outstripped the meagre quantities of specie in circulation, a problem that was as much pressing in England as it was in Scotland, 15 and was hampered by the unwillingness of the Edinburgh banks to issue and lend enough paper money as a substitute. Even in 1774, after the project had collapsed so spectacularly, the author of the unsigned manuscript Case 1768-9 the public banks 'withdrew their credits they had formerly allowed […] within a very narrow compass, whereby the improvements in agriculture were in a great measure stopped and the manufacturers very much distressed'. 16 Smith later confirmed and approved of this credit contraction, and rejected in general the use of bank lending as a way to finance capital-intensive projects. 17 The conviction however, that the Ayr Bank's motives were benign and its function useful for the country long survived the affair in some quarters.
18
The bank has been justly called experimental for establishing a branch network. 19 The centralisation of banking in Edinburgh, combined with a reluctance by the chartered banks to discount inland bills, had left large parts of the country chronically under-banked. 20 South-west Scotland, where over half of the Ayr Bank's partners were based, was only served by two small private banks in Ayr and Dumfries respectively. 21 The co-partnership therefore opened full branches in these two towns, as well as five more agencies around the country. The two existing local banks were bought out in 1771. 22 Rather than act strictly as a provincial bank however, the company underlined its ambition to compete with the public banks by opening a third full branch in Edinburgh. Notwithstanding its latter reputation for 16 irresponsibility and the contemporary complaints from its competitors, 23 at the time the bank was quickly accepted as an integral part of the business landscape of the country, and was indeed instrumental in the establishment of the note exchange system that put an end to the "note picking" wars (the amassing of other banks' notes for sudden presentation for specie) between Scottish banks.
24
There are two explanations in the literature on why the venture failed despite these considerable resources, namely overtrading and culpable mismanagement. The first, of which Smith is the original exponent, focuses on paper money reflux due to excessive issuance, i.e. the too rapid return of banknotes to their issuer in demand for specie. This is supposed to have led in turn to the expedient of 'raising money by circulation' in London through the re-drawing of bills of exchange. Contemporaries made much of the "fictitious" nature of such bills which did not correspond to real commercial contracts, but were merely fiat financial instruments. 25 The bank's expansion is also deemed to have been imprudent from a credit as well as a monetary perspective, through the granting of too many cash accounts and the establishment of an overly enthusiastic bill discounting operation. It has been claimed that these loans were of dubious quality, Ultimately, the biggest weakness of the bank's business model was that its leading directors were neither financiers nor of any other mercantile background, but rather 'young gentlemen of the law, many of them of genius and spirit, but not conversant in matters of trade'. 41 Although it was not altogether unknown for legal professionals to engage in banking in this period, 42 the Directors' pleas of ignorance and lack of training for the job they were asked to perform are as convincing as any unproven accusation of wrongdoing levelled against them. 43 The company was by no means blind to its approaching peril. In February 1771, its growing London debt had led at least one correspondent to refuse to accept any more of its drafts. 44 The situation had grown serious enough by May 1772 as to induce the General Meeting to order a retrenchment, but events were to show that it was already too late to reverse course. It is tempting to assign causal relationships to these events and talk of financial contagion. 50 Indeed, contemporaries were quick to do so, describing
Fordyce's failure as the spark that 'set fire to the mine', 51 and marvelling at the speed with which news of it was brought to Edinburgh by 'a gentleman who came down in 43 hours'. 52 James Boswell famously described the shock as just that: 'like a company connected by an electrical wire, the people in every corner of the country This inability to refinance the bank's liabilities was far more serious than devaluing assets, or even the drama of a bank run and stop of payments. With £600,000 of its bills due to mature shortly, and with new drafts on its correspondents being protested (Table 3) , the company had only a short time before it was forced into bankruptcy.
III
Thoughts turned to a rescue of some sort. The Edinburgh banks did not have the resources to refinance the immense Ayr Bank balance sheet, even had they been thus inclined. The only institution capable of providing the sums required was the Bank of England. Despite press rumours to the contrary, 74 it was apparently not influenced by the prevalent anti-Scottish rhetoric, and offered to double the size of its discount facility to £300,000. But the deal fell through over the terms attached to it, namely a commitment to reduce note circulation by £50,000 every six months until the total amount under discount was back under £150,000, mortgages on 73 NAS GD248/116/4, Alexander Grant to Sir James Grant, Whether by dishonesty or incompetence, the accounting of the annuities was so 'loose and slovenly' as to make it impossible to state what amount was raised exactly. Even worse, although most of the annuities were supposed to be redeemable at the option of the company, the option clause was omitted from the written annuity contracts. The Case, which was addressed to jurist and future Lord
Chancellor Alexander Wedderburn with the aim of finding a legal way out of the annuity debt, explained the reason for this apparent oversight: Wedderburn's opinion was that both this rationale, and any hopes of setting aside the annuities as usurious after all , on the strength of their immense interest rate, were equally unfounded. 85 He was concerned that if the annuitants disputed the verbal option clause in court, the contracts would in all likelihood be judged irredeemable. He finally cast doubt on the prospects of an intervention of a Court of Equity, as it had been the company which had sought the annuities in the first place, being 'imprudent, but not deceived nor imposed on by the annuitants'.
It was agreed verbally, though not entered in the bonds (…), that it should be in the power of [the bank] at any time to redeem these annuities (...). This agreement, though understood between the parties,
All that the annuity measure had achieved therefore was to buy a little time There also remained over £200,000 of banknotes still outstanding and theoretically convertible to specie. Home advised seeking the help of the Edinburgh banks in withdrawing them from circulation in exchange for the company giving up business. He was confident that if the banks were certain that their competitor had resolved to wind-up, they would be keen to take up its banknotes at a profitable to them discount of at least 10 per cent.
Significantly, Home implied that winding-up was not a popular option with many of the partners, and advised that in order to dissolve the Company an extraordinary General Meeting should rather be held Drummond's shares with the understanding that the company would in due time relieve them from any liability arising from them. 93 It is a sign that neither the new regime nor its handling of the unwinding of the bank were universally popular with the partners, that this straightforward transaction dragged on for decades. No formal application for relief was made until 1778, and although the Committee expressed its gratitude and willingness to forward the claim to the General Meeting for approval, it nevertheless never did so. Its reticence can be explained by the fact that such an application would have coincided with the difficulties surrounding the approval of the Precipitation, then presented for the third and final time, as well as that the bond scheme was already encountering serious difficulties. It was thought that an extra demand on the struggling partners on behalf of the richest among them would be too much to ask in that context. 94 The Duke of Buccleuch was still trying to receive compensation from the bank through arbitration in 1791. 
IV
The company now entered its long liquidation phase (Table 5 ). In the same 1773 letters to Dundas, Home outlined a structured debt collection plan in which he divided debtors by occupation and proposed different schedules for payment and for putting pressure on them. He distinguished debtors into two broad categories:
(a) merchants and manufacturers, and (b) farmers and landholders. Home also suggested that those managing the wind-up should be 'men of business who are to be paid for their trouble', rather than high-minded generalists.
To properly motivate such professionals, their payment should come from a percentage of the debts recovered rather than a fixed salary, as 'it can never do harm to make it a man's interest to be honest and industrious'. It is ironic however that when Home took the job himself, he rather preferred a fixed salary after all.
97
Unfortunately for Home's professed 'vanity of having it in [his] power to show that the involved affairs of a great Company may be winded up with integrity and Dispatch', 98 the process quickly encountered difficulties. The pace of asset recovery fell behind that of bond repayments, and although interest was meticulously paid there were never enough funds to fully discharge the principal on schedule. The bonds had a mixed record as tradable securities. There had been hopes that they would prove as liquid as East India bonds, and initially at least they 96 Home's severity can be observed in a series of 28 letters sent between January 1776 and October 1779 to John Carruthers of Holmains, in which he eventually demanded the sale of the latter's estate to discharge his debts. The letter sequence ends abruptly, but sundry debts due by Carruthers were still being auctioned off in 1788 and 1793 (NAS GD207/149 as it ought to be', and even expressed a preference for them over the public funds, fearing that the latter were due for a fall if the ongoing dispute with America deteriorated any further. 101 By August 1778 however, the bonds had fallen into 3½, 5½, and 7 per cent discount for the three final maturities respectively, and there were reportedly 'no buyers whatever' for them. 102 By 1780, market opinion had With the bonds repaid, Home aimed to wrap up the collection process by selling any remaining assets to other collectors in three public auctions ( These problems were partly a result of bad debts. Cumulative asset writeoffs already exceeded £150,000 at the time of the bond emergencies, and were to rise to twice that amount in the future. The crisis had dealt a serious blow to Scotland's economy as land improvement and industrial projects had to be postponed or abandoned, and as trade turned lower in the restriction of credit. 
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The situation was made worse by the depreciation in the value of collateral held by the bank, as the market became glutted with land offered for sale. According to tradition, estates worth £750,000, or even 'a large proportion of the county of Ayr', changed hands following the crisis. This apocryphal figure at best represents a notional pre-crash value rather than actual sale proceeds. 115 The ever sanguine Home hoped to raise £190,000 from estate auctions in 1782, 116 but quickly admitted 'the improbability of finding purchasers (…) in the present State of the Country'.
117
Considering that the bank had to call for over £400,000 in cash "contributions" from its partners to discharge its debts, the liquidation of its land assets was surely done at distressed levels. Whatever the exact amount came to in the end, the land market remained depressed enough for people outside Scotland to contemplate taking advantage and purchasing land cheaply. proprietor lists suffered disproportionately more, with almost three-quarters not contributing.
The There were at least three such payments made for a total of £98 a share, with a further £10 suggested for 1817 (Table 7) . Litigation was so complicated as to make any further dividends uncertain. 
